The Drone Guard: a decentralised Swedish defence

Scrap the frigates. Build a Sweden that cannot be switched off.

It is defended by a hundred thousand people who know their own ground. By people who know where the road goes when GPS does not, where mobile phones lose coverage, which bridges will hold, which roads can carry traffic in winter and how a community keeps functioning when the usual systems have stopped working.

Before Sweden writes its next cheque for around forty billion kronor, we should therefore ask the only question that matters:

Which option makes Sweden hardest to attack?

Today’s politicians no longer seem to pursue defence policy. They sit with the defence industry’s outdated catalogue on their laps and call the order a strategy.

But war does not ask for the catalogue number.

War does not ask for the organisational chart.

War asks what still works.

The people are there. The knowledge is there. The terrain is there. The hunting teams are there. The Home Guard is there. The voluntary defence organisations are there. Technology companies, workshops, radio amateurs, electricians, healthcare workers, fishermen and archipelago residents are there.

What is missing is a state capable of putting the pieces together.

That is why we want to build the Drone Guard – a decentralised Swedish defence that cannot be switched off by knocking out ten targets.

Hunting teams become part of Sweden’s territorial backbone

Sweden has a large community of hunters and a living network of hunting teams across the country.

During the 2024/2025 hunting year, just over 260,000 state hunting permits were issued. There is, however, no public, consolidated national figure for the number of hunting teams. That does not make the local structure any less real. It shows rather how poorly the state has understood and mapped one of the country’s largest existing civil-defence resources.

Hunting teams do not need to be invented. They do not need to be recruited from scratch. They do not need to learn where Sweden is.

They are already there.

They know the forest roads, the terrain, the waterways, the weather and the seasons. They know how people, vehicles and animals normally move. And above all: they notice when something is not right.

The state cannot order that knowledge from an international supplier. It cannot be delivered in 2034. It takes generations to build.

We therefore want to give the Swedish Armed Forces, the Home Guard and the voluntary defence organisations the resources to train and organise people from this existing structure.

Not every hunter should become a soldier.

Not every hunting team should become a military unit.

But those who wish to and are suited to it should be able to train for clearly defined tasks in areas such as observation, reporting, communications, healthcare, logistics, technical support, repair and drone systems.

Military tasks must be carried out by people who are trained, contracted or assigned to wartime service in an authorised Swedish defence organisation.

Civilian tasks must remain civilian.

Under Swedish law. Under Swedish command authority. Under democratic accountability. No private militias – ever.

But stop calling decentralisation dangerous simply because Stockholm does not control every screw from behind a desk.

The danger is not that many people can contribute to Sweden’s defence.

The danger is a defence that ceases to function when a few central systems are knocked out.

Scrap the frigate deal – metal giants have no place in the future

The Government has instructed the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration to negotiate with France’s Naval Group over four FDI-type frigates, which will be known in Sweden as the Luleå class. Delivery is planned for 2030–2034.

There is still no final purchase agreement. FMV must first report the negotiations to the Government. A new government assignment is then required before an agreement can be concluded and the ships ordered.

That means Sweden can still say no.

And Sweden should say no.

Scrap the frigate deal. Hulking metal belongs to the past.

At the same time, let us be intellectually honest: the FDI is not a technologically primitive vessel. It is a capable military platform with advanced air defence, anti-submarine warfare and weapons systems.

What is outdated is not the radar.

What is outdated is not the missile.

What is outdated is the idea that a country becomes modern by concentrating an enormous share of its future capability, personnel, budget and supplier dependence in four huge platforms.

Public information refers to a possible acquisition cost of more than forty billion kronor, just over ten billion per ship. But the final cost depends on which systems and armaments are included. No complete public life-cycle cost has yet been published.

Four ships.

Delivery not until the next decade.

Decades of maintenance, upgrades, ammunition, staffing and dependence on a handful of suppliers.

This is the old defence industry’s answer to the new war: bigger, more expensive, slower and harder to change.

Modern warfare shows something else.

It shows the importance of dispersion, mobility, endurance, spare parts, rapid repair, unmanned systems, robust communications and people who can make decisions when the regular command structure no longer responds.

A ship is a platform.

A country is a system of people.

A navy is about capability – not a blank cheque for every ship deal

Sweden obviously needs a capable navy.

We need air defence, anti-submarine warfare, coastal defence, mine warfare, submarines and protection for our maritime connections. We need to be able to protect the Baltic Sea’s ports, cables, shipping lanes and strategic infrastructure.

But a navy is a capability.

It is not a blank cheque for every deal the defence industry has placed in its catalogue.

Saying no to these four frigates is not saying no to the Swedish navy. It means demanding that the state set out which combination of ships, submarines, mine systems, coastal defence, land-based air defence, sensors, unmanned systems and allied cooperation delivers the greatest real defence effect.

The Drone Guard’s nodes do not replace anti-submarine warfare.

A hunting-team leader does not replace a naval officer.

A fishing boat does not replace a warship.

We have never claimed otherwise.

But four frigates do not replace a functioning Sweden either.

The Government and FMV must therefore openly report the alternatives’:

• acquisition cost,
• whole-life cost,
• staffing requirements,
• ammunition and armaments,
• maintenance and repair capability,
• delivery risks,
• benefits to Swedish industry,
• ability to change suppliers,
• and the defence effect that the same money could create elsewhere.

The state must not be able to say the word security and then avoid showing the receipt.

Our position is clear:

The four frigates must not be ordered. The money must remain within Sweden’s total defence and be used for a broader, faster, more dispersed and more resilient Swedish defence capability.

Some of it should be used for alternative naval and coastal capabilities.

The rest should build a country that continues to function even after the first attack.

Ten thousand preparedness points – not four monuments

The decentralised defence will be built on two levels.

The first level consists of high-quality Drone Guard nodes with sensors, observation drones, backup power, secure communications, technical workstations, spare parts and trained personnel.

The target is:

12 pilot nodes during 2027.

40 operational nodes during 2028 – at least one for each of the Home Guard’s battalion areas.

100 qualified nodes by 2030 at the latest.

Once their effectiveness has been reported, the network can be expanded to no more than 290 qualified nodes, roughly one per municipality.

The second level consists of much simpler preparedness and equipment points: batteries, spare parts, tools, medical equipment, protective equipment, backup power and locally adapted materiel.

In the longer term, these could number in the thousands, up to a maximum of 10,000.

But let us not copy the old disease of the defence industry and turn every simple spare-parts point into a purpose-built monument.

Ten thousand points does not mean ten thousand fully equipped drone containers.

It means many small, simple and interchangeable parts instead of a few perfect central depots.

The point is brutally simple:

Four large objects can be picked out on a map.

Hundreds of qualified nodes and thousands of simpler preparedness points are an entirely different problem for an attacker.

Resilience is not just quality.

Resilience is also quantity.

We will show our own receipt

In our open planning assumption, a high-quality, local and unarmed sensor and communications node is estimated to cost between five and twelve million kronor.

With a 30 per cent contingency margin, one hundred nodes would mean an investment framework of approximately 650 million to 1.56 billion kronor.

These are not quotations. They are a disclosed planning assumption.

The calculation excludes weapons, classified cryptographic systems, permanent staff, permanent construction work and annual operations. Those costs must be reported separately before full deployment is approved.

We will not compare the total cost of four fully equipped warships with the price of an empty container shell.

The same accounting rules must apply to both options:

Investment. Personnel. Training. Ammunition. Maintenance. Operations. Technical upgrades. Replacement equipment. Supplier dependence.

That is the difference between propaganda and responsibility.

We will report what we know.

We will mark out what we estimate.

And we will say openly what we do not yet know.

One hundred thousand trained people – not one hundred thousand private soldiers

The aim is for 100,000 people to have completed quality-assured training in unmanned systems, observation, reporting, communications, technical maintenance, repair, healthcare or logistics by 2030 at the latest.

That does not mean 100,000 armed soldiers.

It does not mean 100,000 drone pilots.

It means a society in which far more people than today know what to do when the power grid, mobile telephony, transport routes or ordinary government functions have been knocked out.

Reaching 100,000 trained people from 2027 to the end of 2030 requires an average training capacity of around 25,000 people a year.

Training must therefore be divided into clear levels:

• Basic preparedness: observation, reporting, first aid, local logistics and civilian reporting channels.
• Technical preparedness: communications, backup power, battery management, repair, sensors and spare parts.
• Military specialist capability: qualified drone systems, countermeasures, command and tasks requiring conscription, employment, a Home Guard agreement or wartime assignment.

Sweden is not starting from zero. The Swedish Armed Forces reported 23,069 Home Guard soldiers in 2025. The Home Guard is organised into 40 battalions across the country, and Sweden has 18 voluntary defence organisations that already recruit and train people for civilian and military specialist tasks.

The structure therefore exists.

What is missing is the scale, the technology, the mission and the political will.

A lone drone is a gadget.

One hundred thousand trained people in a functioning network are a defence capability.

The archipelago and fishing fleet become Sweden’s outer eyes

The same principle applies at sea: use what Sweden already has.

The Baltic Sea is full of cables, pipelines, merchant ships, ports and strategic infrastructure. At the same time, fishermen, seafarers, archipelago residents and professional groups spend time on these waters every week and know them better than almost any government official temporarily posted there ever will.

We want to create legally secure arrangements for training, compensation and reporting.

Anyone given a military observation task must have an agreement or wartime assignment within an authorised organisation.

Other people must be able to report irregularities through civilian authority channels without being turned into combatants.

A fisherman is not a warship.

But a society that discards thirty years of local knowledge and then tries to buy back the same attentiveness in the form of a single sensor has misunderstood both technology and economics.

Sweden must function when mobile phones do not

A modern defence without communications is people and units that do not know what the others are doing.

The territorial organisation must therefore be able to communicate when mobile networks are down, electricity supplies are disrupted or central command systems come under attack.

That requires local fallback solutions, several technical systems, backup power, secure interfaces and regular exercises.

This must not be invented when the crisis begins.

It must already work.

Not every part of Sweden needs to be able to communicate with every other part all the time. But each part must be able to continue working locally and then reconnect to the ordinary chain of command.

That is the difference between a pyramid and a network.

Switch off the top of the pyramid and chaos follows.

A well-built network finds another route.

Break the defence industry’s monopoly on convenience

Who benefits when every new defence system becomes bigger, more expensive and more complicated?

The people already inside.

The longer the contract, the fewer competitors remain.

The more bespoke the system, the harder it becomes to change supplier.

The higher the cost of entry, the fewer small Swedish technology companies can take part.

Eventually the state has built a dependency that it solemnly renames “strategic security”.

But a monopoly does not become security merely because a minister gives a speech in front of it.

The state should procure suitable parts of the defence of the future as a modern technology market:

Several suppliers.

Short development cycles.

Open interfaces where security permits.

Standard components when they are better, cheaper and easier to replace.

Rapid trials.

Rapid failures.

Rapid improvements.

Swedish technology companies and small businesses must be able to compete with the big players.

And above all: the state must retain the practical right to change supplier.

When the state can no longer change supplier, it has not created security.

It has surrendered power.

Sweden should have advanced weapons systems

Here the opponents will construct their usual straw man.

They will say that the alternative to four frigates is hobby drones from an electronics shop, hunters with mobile phones and a few containers in the woods.

That is nonsense.

Sweden needs fighter aircraft, submarines, warships, air defence, coastal and mine defence, sensors, precision weapons, professional soldiers, sailors and officers, as well as world-class technical systems.

Sweden has already signed agreements totalling 8.7 billion kronor for GUTE II and other air-defence and counter-drone systems, with deliveries planned for 2027 and 2028. The Drone Guard will connect to and reinforce such systems – not pretend they do not exist and not count the same money twice.

The first local Drone Guard nodes are unarmed sensor, communications and repair nodes.

They detect.

They report.

They keep communications alive.

They repair and replace.

The actual engagement of hostile systems must be handled by trained military units and approved weapons systems.

The spearpoint is needed.

But the spearpoint must not be the entire pyramid.

Our model first builds a country that cannot be switched off – and then places the world’s best Swedish and allied weapons systems on top.

Sweden must not be a sitting elephant

Sweden will never win by building a smaller copy of a great power.

We do not have a great power’s population.

We do not have a great power’s budget.

We do not have a great power’s industrial volume.

But we have other assets.

We have high educational attainment, technical expertise, telecommunications, software, engineers, mechanics, healthcare workers, hunters, archipelago residents, small businesses and a large territory.

We have people who actually know the country.

Our goal is therefore simple:

No attacker should be able to sit in front of a map of Sweden, point out ten targets and say:

Take those and the country is switched off.

That is the old pyramid.

We want to build the network:

One hundred thousand people with documented and relevant preparedness skills.

One hundred high-quality Drone Guard nodes by 2030 at the latest.

Thousands of simpler preparedness and equipment points.

Local eyes with clearly defined civilian or military roles.

Robust, practised communications.

A technology market that changes faster than the adversary.

And on top of that distributed foundation: qualified Swedish and allied weapons systems.

This is not a cheaper way of building the old defence.

It is a different way of thinking about what a country is – and what it means to defend it.

Scrap the frigate deal.

Open the calculation.

Show the receipt.

Reallocate the roughly forty billion kronor within Sweden’s total defence.

Build the Drone Guard.

Build a Sweden that cannot be switched off.

The people are already there.

The knowledge is already there.

Sweden is already there.

What is missing is politicians brave enough to close the defence industry’s catalogue and open their eyes to the country they are actually entrusted to defend.

The future will not wait.

The Drone Guard – a decentralised Swedish defence

Implementation plan

An opinion piece is allowed to burn.

An implementation plan must also hold up when the lights come on.

The Drone Guard must therefore not be built as yet another expensive catalogue order in which the state chooses one supplier, signs a thirty-year contract and then calls the dependency security.

It must be built step by step.

It must be tested rigorously.

It must be repairable, adaptable and able to change technology.

And the state must report the cost before it orders – not when the invoice is already on the table.

Immediately: scrap the frigates and open the calculation

The acquisition of the four Luleå-class frigates must be stopped.

The Government announced on 26 August 2026 that a signing ceremony for Sweden’s acquisition of four frigates would be held on 31 August. The press release does not, however, disclose any final public price, complete life-cycle cost or the terms of the state’s future financial commitments.

If no binding agreement has yet been signed, it must not be signed.

If a binding agreement has already been signed, the Government must publish:

• the contract’s total value,
• which weapons systems and ammunition are included,
• options and future additional orders,
• the payment schedule,
• termination and renegotiation terms,
• costs already incurred,
• and the cost of exiting or limiting the deal.

No further options, follow-on orders or political commitments should be approved before this accounting has been presented.

At the same time, the Swedish Armed Forces, FMV and the Swedish Defence Research Agency must, within twelve months, report how Sweden’s priority naval tasks will be addressed without the four frigates.

The inquiry must cover a combination of:

• existing and modernised surface combatants,
• submarines,
• mine defence,
• coastal missiles and other coastal defence,
• land-based air defence,
• unmanned air and maritime systems,
• sensors and underwater surveillance,
• protection of ports, cables and maritime connections,
• and operational cooperation with our Nordic and other NATO allies.

Scrapping the frigates does not mean scrapping the Swedish navy.

It means the Government must prove that these four highly expensive platforms are the best use of Sweden’s money, personnel and time.

A navy is a capability. It is not a blank cheque for every ship in the defence industry’s catalogue.

2026–2027: decide, standardise and test

The Drone Guard will be established as a joint programme for:

• the Swedish Armed Forces, including the Home Guard,
• the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration,
• the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency,
• relevant voluntary defence organisations,
• municipalities and other civilian preparedness actors where the tasks are civilian,
• and Swedish companies and research environments through competitively tendered assignments.

The Swedish Armed Forces will be responsible for military requirements, military command, security protection and the wartime organisation.

FMV will be responsible for procurement, technical integration and the ability to change components and suppliers.

The Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency will be responsible for coordination with civil defence and nationally important communications systems.

The voluntary defence organisations will assist with recruitment and training within their approved areas of expertise.

The roles must be clear from day one:

Military tasks are carried out by military-organised, trained, contracted or wartime-assigned personnel. Civilian participants have civilian tasks and civilian reporting channels. No private militias. No independently armed drone groups.

Two different types of node

The programme must distinguish between two levels from the outset.

1. High-quality Drone Guard nodes

These contain sensors, observation drones, backup power, secure communications, technical workstations, spare parts and trained personnel.

The first nodes are primarily unarmed sensor, communications and repair nodes. The engagement of hostile systems will be carried out by military units using approved weapons and countermeasure systems.

2. Simpler preparedness and equipment points

These may contain batteries, tools, spare parts, medical equipment, protective equipment, backup power and other locally adapted materiel.

They are cheaper, simpler and considerably more numerous.

Ten thousand preparedness points therefore does not mean ten thousand fully equipped drone containers.

Twelve pilot nodes

During 2027, twelve high-quality, unarmed pilot nodes will be built in locations with differing conditions:

• cities and urban areas,
• forest and sparsely populated areas,
• the coast and archipelago,
• port and industrial areas,
• transport routes,
• and areas with particularly difficult electricity or communications provision.

The nodes will be tested for:

• observation and reporting,
• backup communications,
• technical maintenance and repair,
• battery and spare-parts management,
• protection of nationally important activities,
• cooperation between military and civilian command,
• and continued operation when other nodes or central systems are knocked out.

A limited number of simpler preparedness points will be tested in parallel as a separate and considerably cheaper node type.

The state must retain its freedom of action

Technical interfaces must be documented and interchangeable wherever security permits.

The state must not depend on all future drones, batteries, radio systems, sensors or software coming from the same supplier.

Classified components may remain classified.

But the state must still know how the systems work together and have a practical ability to replace a supplier that becomes too expensive, too slow or technologically obsolete.

When the state can no longer change supplier, it has not bought security. It has sold its freedom of action.

2027–2028: 40 operational Drone Guard nodes

By 2028 at the latest, at least one mobile sensor, communications and repair node must be located within each of the Home Guard’s 40 battalion areas.

The Home Guard has a territorial organisation of 40 battalions and reported 23,069 Home Guard soldiers in 2025. This gives the Drone Guard an existing national structure to build on – not an organisation that must first be invented.

The nodes must:

• operate under ordinary military command when used militarily,
• be able to operate locally if central command is temporarily cut off,
• have backup power and alternative communications routes,
• be movable as the threat picture changes,
• and be able to replace lost or damaged equipment without bringing the entire system to a halt.

During the transition, the nodes must be able to use the existing Rakel system where authorisation and technology permit. At the same time, they must be prepared for connection to SWEN, the new system previously referred to as Rakel generation 2, and to the Swedish Armed Forces’ own command systems.

The Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency is planning pilot operations for SWEN during 2026–2027, live migration during 2028–2029 and full transition for Rakel users by 2030 at the latest.

Spare parts, batteries, antennae, backup power and replacement drones must be stored regionally.

A node must not stand idle because a particular specialist screw is sitting in a central warehouse 300 kilometres away.

Training: three levels, clear responsibility

The aim is for 100,000 people to have completed documented, quality-assured training relevant to total defence by the end of 2030 at the latest.

This requires an average of around 25,000 trained people per year from 2027 to 2030.

The target is divided into three levels.

Level 1: basic preparedness

Training may include:

• observation,
• reporting,
• first aid,
• local logistics,
• basic communications,
• safe battery and equipment handling,
• and civilian reporting channels.

This level involves no military combat task.

Level 2: technical preparedness

Training may include:

• backup power,
• radio and antenna systems,
• sensors,
• technical fault-finding,
• repair,
• spare-parts management,
• drone maintenance,
• and communications under disrupted conditions.

Level 3: military specialist capability

This level may include:

• military drone flying,
• navigation in a disrupted environment,
• command and target reporting,
• countermeasures,
• electronic warfare,
• advanced sensor use,
• and other tasks requiring military training and wartime assignment.

Military specialist roles will be staffed through conscription, employment, Home Guard agreements or other approved voluntary agreements involving wartime assignment.

No person should be counted several times because they complete several courses.

Each level of training must have:

• a clear learning objective,
• a practical test,
• a documented period of validity,
• refresher requirements,
• a responsible training organisation,
• and a defined task in a crisis or war.

Sweden has 18 voluntary defence organisations that already recruit and train people for civilian and military specialist tasks. They are an existing resource, but their training capacity and funding must be expanded if the target of 100,000 people is to be more than a number in an election manifesto.

2028–2030: 100 priority Drone Guard nodes

By 2030 at the latest, Sweden must have a total of 100 high-quality Drone Guard nodes.

They will be prioritised for areas where disruption would have major consequences, such as:

• ports,
• railway and road junctions,
• energy supply,
• water supply,
• healthcare,
• telecommunications,
• military mobilisation and logistics,
• the coast and archipelago,
• and other nationally important infrastructure.

Exact locations do not need to be made public.

The state must nevertheless be able to report publicly how many nodes are operational, how many have been exercised, what availability they have and what the programme costs.

Sweden or European partners must build capacity for:

• production,
• system integration,
• software maintenance,
• repair,
• battery and spare-parts supply,
• and rapid replacement of lost equipment.

The network will be exercised every year under conditions in which:

• mobile telephony is down,
• internet connections are disrupted,
• the electricity grid is partly out,
• individual nodes have been destroyed,
• satellite navigation is unreliable,
• and central command is periodically unreachable.

A system that only works when everything else works is not a preparedness system.

It is a demonstration.

2030–2034: national expansion after proven effect

Following an independent assessment of effectiveness, the network may be expanded to a maximum of one high-quality Drone Guard node per municipality, up to a total of 290 nodes.

Expansion must not happen automatically.

It must be decided on the basis of:

• measured military and civilian benefit,
• actual availability,
• training results,
• cost per operational node,
• ability to function during outages,
• supplier dependence,
• and lessons from technological development and war.

The simpler preparedness and equipment points can then be expanded step by step towards thousands of locations.

A long-term ceiling of 10,000 points may be tested, but only after a separate cost calculation, clear requirements for their contents and regular audits.

Ten thousand must never become a sacred number.

We will build as many points as make Sweden stronger – not as many as make a brochure look impressive.

Costs

Public information and its status

Four Luleå-class frigates: around 40 billion kronor

This is a preliminary figure reported in the trade press. The state has not yet published a fixed final price or a complete life-cycle cost. The Government has announced a signing ceremony on 31 August 2026, making the demand for full financial disclosure immediate.

GUTE II and other air-defence and counter-drone systems: 8.7 billion kronor

The agreements cover, among other things, command systems, sensors, electronic warfare, effectors, ammunition and vehicles. Deliveries are due in 2027 and 2028.

Saab’s mobile drone protection: approximately 2.6 billion kronor

This order is included in the overall 8.7 billion kronor initiative and must therefore not be counted as additional separate funding for the Drone Guard.

SWEN, previously Rakel generation 2: 2.3 billion kronor in reported establishment funding for 2025–2027

The system is a broad national communications initiative for nationally important actors. It is not the Drone Guard’s private network and must not be recorded as if the money had been earmarked solely for this programme.

NATO-interoperable command-support systems: framework agreement value of 1.5 billion kronor

This is a seven-year framework agreement. A framework agreement value is a maximum possible value, not a payment already made.

The Drone Guard node – an open planning assumption

In AIP’s open planning assumption, a high-quality, local and unarmed sensor, communications and repair node is estimated to cost between five and twelve million kronor.

The calculation consists of:

• 10–12 secure observation and thermal-camera drones and two docking systems: 2–5 million kronor
• container or trailer, workstations, backup power, batteries and climate control: 1–2 million kronor
• radio, antenna mast, local computer system, cyber protection and backup communications: 1–3 million kronor
• spare parts, local introductory training, integration and initial maintenance: 1–2 million kronor

This is a planning assumption – not a claimed quotation from a supplier.

The calculation excludes:

• weapons and military effectors,
• classified cryptographic systems,
• permanent construction work,
• permanent staff,
• annual operations,
• future replacement equipment,
• and the cost of the national training target of 100,000 people.

These costs must be reported separately.

We will not compare the total cost of four armed warships with the price of an empty container shell.

The same headings must be used for both options:

Investment. Personnel. Training. Operations. Ammunition. Maintenance. Upgrades. Supplier dependence. Service life. Defence effect.

Investment framework with a 30 per cent contingency margin

• 40 nodes: 260–624 million kronor
• 100 nodes: 650 million–1.56 billion kronor
• 290 nodes: 1.89–4.52 billion kronor

The simpler preparedness and equipment points are not covered by this unit cost.

They must not be expanded to 10,000 before the state has reported what each point is to contain, what it costs to keep operational and what real preparedness effect it delivers.

Training gets its own calculation

Training 100,000 people is not included in the node cost.

Before training is fully scaled up, the Government must report:

• cost per level of training,
• duration of training,
• number of instructors available,
• need for training equipment,
• cost of refresher training,
• administration and skills registers,
• and which participants are to be assigned to wartime service.

The first training courses can begin alongside the pilot nodes.

But the national target must not be hidden as a small line in the container’s unit price.

One hundred thousand trained people is a major defence reform. It should therefore have its own budget.

Funding and reallocation

The Drone Guard generates no direct financial income.

It is insurance, preparedness and defence capability.

The initial investment framework of no more than 1.6 billion kronor for 100 high-quality nodes will be financed by reallocating future defence materiel planning.

Around 40 billion kronor is a preliminary planning value for the frigate deal. It is not a sack of money already sitting on the floor of the Ministry of Finance.

From the possible scope for reallocation, the state must first deduct:

• costs already incurred,
• any costs of cancellation or renegotiation,
• and the alternative investments required for air defence, anti-submarine warfare, coastal defence and protection of maritime connections.

The remaining scope must stay within total defence and be used for:

• Drone Guard nodes,
• training,
• ammunition and spare parts,
• robust communications,
• medical and repair preparedness,
• civilian resilience,
• alternative naval and coastal capabilities,
• and Swedish and European production capacity.

Through the defence decision, the military defence has been allocated more than 170 billion kronor for the period up to 2030. This is the overarching reinforcement of defence – not an extra source of funding that can be counted on top of the frigate allocation a second time.

On today’s planning assumption, a network of 100 qualified nodes corresponds to approximately 0.4–0.9 per cent of that reinforcement.

That is a comparison of scale.

It does not mean that the money has already been set aside.

GUTE II, SWEN and the NATO-interoperable command systems may contribute parts of the infrastructure. But appropriations already decided must not be counted again and presented as new money for the Drone Guard.

The same krona may only be counted once. Even when a defence minister is holding a press conference.

What we know

• The Government has announced that a signing ceremony for the frigate acquisition will be held on 31 August 2026.
• No complete public final price or public life-cycle cost for the frigates has been disclosed.
• The Home Guard has 40 battalions and reported 23,069 Home Guard soldiers in 2025.
• Sweden has 18 voluntary defence organisations contributing to civilian and military defence.
• During the 2024/2025 hunting year, 260,047 state hunting permits were issued. The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency’s statistics do not, however, report a consolidated national number of hunting teams.
• Sweden has already ordered significant air-defence, counter-drone, communications and command capability.
• SWEN will gradually replace the current Rakel system, with migration planned from 2028 and full transition by 2030 at the latest.

What we do not yet know

• The exact legal form and financial terms of the documents to be signed on 31 August.
• The frigates’ final purchase price, exact armament and complete life-cycle cost.
• The cost of cancelling or renegotiating the deal if binding agreements are signed.
• How many operational units are included in GUTE II and their unit cost.
• The final procured price of a security-approved Swedish Drone Guard node.
• The cost of a simpler preparedness and equipment point.
• The full cost of training and refresher training for 100,000 people.
• The annual costs of personnel, exercises, operations, maintenance and replacement equipment.
• How much of the existing communications systems can be used without new investment.
• Which combination of alternative naval systems delivers the same or better overall defence effect than the four frigates.

Not knowing everything is no argument for continuing in the dark.

It is an argument for switching on the light.

Decide now

responsible intelligence in politics proposes that Sweden should:

• stop the acquisition of the four frigates,
• disclose openly all commitments entered into and all costs,
• within twelve months produce an alternative plan for Sweden’s naval air defence, anti-submarine warfare, coastal defence and maritime connections,
• launch the Drone Guard during 2027 with twelve pilot nodes,
• expand the network to 40 operational nodes during 2028,
• build 100 high-quality nodes by 2030 at the latest,
• set aside an initial investment framework of no more than 1.6 billion kronor for these hundred nodes,
• build training capacity for the target of 100,000 people with documented preparedness skills,
• and approve further expansion only after costs have been openly reported and effectiveness demonstrated.

Expansion beyond 100 high-quality nodes requires a new decision.

Expansion towards 10,000 simpler preparedness points requires its own calculation.

The training target requires its own financial framework.

And every major decision must be followed by a public report in which secret operational information may be placed in a classified annex – but where costs, targets and results do not disappear behind the word security.

The principle is simple:

Report what we know.

Mark out what we estimate.

Say openly what we do not yet know.

And do not let uncertainty become an excuse for handing politics over to the defence industry’s catalogue.

Scrap the frigates.

Build the Drone Guard.

Build a Sweden that cannot be switched off.

That is what responsible intelligence looks like when it leaves the podium and starts defending the country.