Source material: the frigate decision and a decentralised defence

The decision that was actually made

The figure of SEK 33 billion appears to refer to Spain's Navantia bid, which DN reported as "just under" SEK 33 billion for four vessels, excluding ammunition, torpedoes and missiles. The French alternative chosen by Sweden has been reported at around SEK 40 billion, just over 4 billion dollars. The formal Swedish decision on 19 May 2026 was not a final contract signing, but a government instruction to FMV to begin negotiations on four FDI frigates from France's Naval Group.

The decision did not come out of nowhere. The chain leads back through the 2020 defence decision, which initiated preparations for new surface combatants, and the 2024 total-defence decision, which highlighted the Luleå class and stated that procurement would begin in 2025–2030. In December 2024, the Riksdag approved the broader defence direction but did not choose a supplier; supplier selection lay with the Government through FMV.

The conclusion is therefore precisely this: the Riksdag decided the capability direction and spending framework, the Government made the supplier decision, and FMV is the agency negotiating and carrying out the procurement.

Who decided, who benefits and who influenced the process from outside

The formal political owners of the decision are Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and Minister for Defence Pål Jonson, on behalf of the Government. The Swedish Armed Forces had submitted their proposal before the political supplier selection, meaning that the military had considerable upstream influence over the options the Government chose between. According to Reuters, Chief of the Navy Johan Norlén has stressed the frigates' strategic importance for protecting sea lanes in the Baltic Sea.

The direct commercial winner is Naval Group. The likely Swedish industrial winners are led by Saab, since Sweden intends, according to Reuters, to integrate domestically developed weapons systems into the vessels. There is also a broader French-Swedish defence reciprocity: a strategic partnership in 2024, deeper cooperation between Saab and MBDA, and a French order for Saab GlobalEye. This does not prove any improper quid pro quo, but it does show a real two-way logic surrounding the frigate choice.

Outside the Government and the Riksdag, the Swedish Armed Forces, FMV, the Defence Commission, as well as foreign governments and companies, have influenced the process. Both Spanish and French frigates were physically showcased in Sweden during the competition, and Naval Group explicitly thanked the French state for its support. Naval Group has also signed a letter of intent with Oresund DryDocks for local maintenance, which could create Swedish winners beyond Saab.

What the frigates add – and how vulnerable they are

Naval Group's FDI frigate is approximately 122 metres long and around 4,500 tonnes, with an endurance of 5,000 nautical miles and a stated capability against surface, air, submarine, asymmetric and cyber threats. The Swedish Government Bill described the Luleå class as adding endurance, stronger air-defence capability and maritime command capability, integrated into Sweden's and NATO's air and missile defence. The decision was politically justified in part by the aim of tripling Sweden's air-defence capability at sea.

The question "how easy are they to knock out?" has no simple answer. Modern frigates are valuable because they carry radar, command systems, air defence and anti-submarine warfare capabilities – and for precisely that reason they are also premium targets. Analyses of hypersonic weapons agree on one point: speed, manoeuvrability and low flight altitude reduce warning time and make interception much more difficult. A frigate's survival therefore depends more on the entire defensive network than on the ship itself.

Ukraine's experience in the Black Sea shows that unmanned maritime systems can impose sea denial on a larger fleet at a fraction of the cost. The lesson is not that warships are obsolete, but that naval vessels in confined waters need layered protection, intelligence support, adaptation, and countermeasures against drones and unmanned craft. For Sweden, the frigates are therefore important but not self-sufficient: survival will be determined by whether Sweden can protect the entire chain of effects – detection, targeting, tracking, electronic warfare, decoys, logistics and harbour protection.

What a hunting-team-based drone network can realistically do

There is no official national register of hunting parties as such, since the system is based on hunting licences, hunting areas and moose management. Approximately 260,000 state hunting licences were paid for during the 2024/2025 hunting year; the Swedish Association for Hunting and Wildlife Management states that around 250,000 of Sweden's approximately 300,000 hunters hunt moose, and the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency lists 130 moose-management areas. The safest assessment is that Sweden has a very large, already distributed pool of people with knowledge of the terrain and probably tens of thousands of hunting parties.

Counter-drone systems exist, and Ukraine reports that autonomous interceptor drones are already bringing down Shahed-like craft. Sweden is also investing in mobile, modular C-UAS through FMV and Saab. But these are military systems with sensors, command responsibility, identification procedures and rules of engagement – not the natural first task for unintegrated civilian hunting parties. The safer Swedish route is to recruit these people into the Home Guard, voluntary defence organisations or other authorised total-defence structures.

Short answer: yes, hunting parties could be highly useful in a decentralised, drone-supported defence network. No, they should not be treated as improvised civilian air-defence or armed drone units outside state command authority.

Lessons from Ukraine and Iran

The core lesson from Iran's drone campaign in the Gulf is that massive, cheap drone pressure is strategically effective even when it is not spectacularly destructive: large waves of one-way drones disrupt infrastructure and force the defender to expend expensive missiles, while the attacker preserves its more sophisticated systems. The aim is to exhaust, distract and stretch the defender. Sweden therefore needs not just a few exclusive platforms, but a far denser layer of affordable sensor and counter-drone capability across the entire country.

The assessment is this: Sweden is best defended by making itself difficult to paralyse, difficult to surprise and difficult to isolate. Some high-quality platforms are necessary – frigates escort sea lanes, provide area air defence, conduct anti-submarine warfare and lead maritime operations within NATO's system. With a further SEK 33–40 billion, the recommendation would not be to scrap the frigates, but to retain the core naval programme and devote a very substantial additional share to distributed counter-drone defence, local sensor networks, regional drone reserves, backup communications, harbour and archipelago surveillance, hardening of bases and civilian infrastructure, rapid repair capability, stocks of batteries and spare parts, and a greatly expanded route from civilian expertise into the Home Guard.

In one sentence: Sweden should defend itself with distributed mass under disciplined command, supported by a smaller number of high-quality naval and air-defence nodes – not by choosing one over the other.

The party's working paper: four perspectives on the frigate decision

The Palme lens

Defence must be legitimate in the eyes of the people, major procurement decisions must withstand public scrutiny, and security policy must not become technology worship. Sweden needs credible defence capability in the Baltic Sea and must be able to contribute within NATO. The risk is that expensive systems become symbols of determination while the everyday vulnerabilities of total defence remain. A defence that is not rooted in the people is more fragile.

The Stenbeck lens

What are we getting for the money? What is the delivery time? Where are the bottlenecks? What can be scaled? An existing ship design may allow faster delivery than developing one in Sweden, but SEK 40 billion invested in a handful of platforms is a concentrated risk. If you spend SEK 40 billion on four ships, every krona should also buy speed, adaptability and industrial leverage – otherwise you have not bought the future, only tonnage.

The network lens

Networks before hierarchy, knowledge before prestige, decentralised intelligence before central planning, and rapid feedback from reality. Frigates can be strong nodes with command, sensors and air defence. But if the ships become isolated prestige platforms, they violate network logic. The future of defence will be decided by how many intelligent eyes, ears and hands can be connected when the country comes under pressure.

A working line for responsible intelligence in politics

• Recognise the need for naval air-defence capability.
• Demand transparent reporting of cost, life-cycle cost, armament, sensors and Swedish industrial benefit.
• Demand that every major platform investment be matched by a decentralised defence initiative.
• Propose a Swedish programme for distributed sensor and drone capability under state leadership.
• Link this to the Home Guard, voluntary defence organisations and civil preparedness – not private militias.

Older text: peace, neutrality and what we are defending

The party's older ideas material includes a line on peace that raises different questions from the equipment debate: whether Sweden's two hundred years of peace represent a social, emotional and spiritual store of value that ought to be weighed in security policy, and whether a nuanced discussion of non-alignment, NATO and peacebuilding can take place without fear as its driving force.

The text argues for empathetic communication in the tradition of Marshall Rosenberg, against domineering language and against the violence of passivity: doing nothing when someone is suffering is just as dangerous as active violence. It reminds us that a society's prosperity can be measured by how its children are doing, and that distributional policy should therefore begin with children.

The ideas text is an older working document and not adopted policy. It is included here because it forms part of the material behind the party's defence and security line, and because it asks the question that is otherwise easily lost in the equipment debate: what, exactly, are we defending?

Sources

• The Government: Decision to negotiate with France on Luleå-class air-defence frigates
• Swedish Armed Forces: French frigates for the Swedish Armed Forces
• FMV: New surface combatants – larger and with greater capability
• Riksdag: Total Defence 2025–2030 (Prop. 2024/25:34)
• The Government: Total Defence 2021–2025 (Prop. 2020/21:30)
• Naval Group: Defence and Intervention Frigate (FDI)
• CSIS: Maritime Domain Lessons from Russia-Ukraine
• CSIS: Unpacking Iran's Drone Campaign in the Gulf
• CSIS: Complex Air Defense (hypersonic threats)
• Swedish Environmental Protection Agency: Frequently asked questions about hunting
• MSB: Total Defence – you are part of Sweden's preparedness
• DN: Spain presses the price – wants to build frigates for Sweden